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in Brazil’s social protection
policy
Vilmar E. Faria
Doctor of Sociology This study, now being published posthumously, examines
Brazil’s recent experience in formulating and implementing
government social policies and assesses the prospects for
establishing a “social authority” for centralizing and
coordinating such policies. It describes the complex pattern
of exclusion and vulnerability against which social reforms
must be instituted in Brazil. It then goes on to review the
social development strategy adopted as part of the Plano
Real in 1994, which seeks to restructure the financing,
outlays and benefits of the social protection system in order
to increase its effectiveness, coverage and redistributive
impact. Finally, it analyses the coordination of federal social
policies, especially at the macropolitical and
intergovernmental level, drawing special attention to the
creation of sectoral chambers and policy integration
mechanisms to replace former bureaucratic coordination
structures.
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I
Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, the challenges arising in
different sectors and resulting from various crises have
led to profound structural transformations in Brazil,
which have had significant repercussions at the
institutional level.
These changes were triggered by a number of
factors. Foremost among them were the
redemocratization process, which speeded up during
the 1980s, and the structural limits encountered by
State-promoted industrialization under an umbrella of
protectionism. A series of elements contributed to the
deterioration of the situation: technological change and
the reorganization of capitalism at the international
level; the political, economic and social collapse of “real
socialism” as implemented under the hegemony of the
Soviet Union; the crisis of the Welfare State originally
inspired by the social democratic movement and the
resultant wave of reforms in this system; the
intensification of globalization, above all at the financial
level and in terms of real-time access to global flows
of information and images; and the growing importance
of knowledge as a strategic factor of production.
As a timely –or untimely– reaction to these
tremendous challenges, the country had to embark on a
wide range of reforms, including the adoption of a new
Constitution in 1988 and its partial amendment in 1994;
the adoption of various economic adjustment plans,
culminating in the successful Plano Real in 1994, which
set the seal on a period of far-reaching economic reforms
in the areas of monetary stabilization, fiscal adjustment,
greater openness of the economy and an ambitious
privatization programme; reform of the State, and last
but not least, changes in the institutions and programmes
for the implementation of social protection policies.
Among the main economic reforms were trade and
financial liberalization, exchange-rate modification,
deregulation, the elimination of foreign investment
barriers, privatization and fiscal discipline –all
prerequisites for the future expansion of foreign
investment. In the social sphere, the main efforts were
aimed at concentrating public expenditure in the health,
education and infrastructure sectors, although
distortions persisted in the social security system. The
main lessons to be drawn from the Brazilian reform
experience include the net benefit of containing
inflation and increasing trade surpluses and the
importance of adjusting the financial sector at low cost
in terms of GDP and attracting external savings for
reinitiating the growth cycle. Since Brazil did not follow
the exact sequence prescribed by international financial
institutions, the reforms will imply new and important
challenges for the country in the near future (Baumann,
1999).
In order to grasp the scope and significance of the
social protection policy reforms, it is necessary to take
account, on the one hand, of the broader structural
context in which those reforms are being applied and,
on the other, of the most important features of the
Brazilian social situation and the country’s social
protection system. Mention should also be made of the
main dimensions of the social development project
adopted under the Plano Real, and the institutional
problems associated with coordination of the Federal
Government’s social policies should be analysed. A
brief assessment should also be made of the main results
obtained and the considerable amount of work still to
be done under the public programme. In the following
pages, we will attempt to analyse each of these aspects.
Vilmar E. Faria, Doctor of Sociology (Harvard University), held
the post of full professor at the State University at Campinas
(Unicamp) and also worked as an assistant professor at the
universities of São Paulo and Brasilia, visiting professor at various
universities in the United States, and Director of the Brazilian Centre
for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP) and of the Foundation for
Administrative Development (FUNDAP) at São Paulo. He occupied
the post of Executive Secretary of the Social Policy Department of
the Office of the President of the Republic from 1996 to 1999,
where he contributed to the formulation of the Alvorada project
(for poverty reduction in less developed cities), the development
of the Community Solidarity Programme, and the incorporation of
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II
Social protection problems and policies
in present-day Brazil: a paradox
At the dawn of the 1990s, Brazil’s social situation was
somewhat paradoxical.
On the one hand, after at least 50 years of rapid
economic growth based on import substitution
industrialization and an aggressive role by the State as
an economic stakeholder, the country had become one
of the most dynamic and complex urban/industrial
societies on the capitalist periphery, and one of the ten
leading economies in the world. It had a large business
sector consisting of a wide range of national business
entrepreneurs as well as industrialists from the most
dynamic economies of the First World (Germany,
United States, United Kingdom, France and Sweden,
among others). It had already succeeded in developing
a modern, large-scale and diversified commercial
agricultural system, and although it remained a
relatively closed economy, it had managed to establish
a pattern of differentiated exports ranging from
traditional primary products to consumer durables,
automobiles, and even aircraft. It had one of the largest
advertising markets in the world and a relatively
comprehensive and diversified system of postgraduate
education and science and technology studies. Its
differentiated occupational and class structure was
characterized by high geographic and social mobility
and by the existence of an occupationally diversified
middle class and quite a significant industrial working
class, located especially in the central and southern
regions of the country (Faria, 1986).
At the same time, however, the overall picture in
the country was still one of serious inequality, exclusion
and social backwardness, due to its past as a colonial
and slave-based society and the exclusive pattern of
protected industrialization. Consequently, it still had a
large, poor rural sector, made up of owners of small,
extremely unproductive family properties and masses
of landless labourers. The cities harboured droves of
unskilled manual and non-manual workers, who
constituted a large excluded and marginalized sector.
Education and health services were backward in terms
of both access and quality. Adult illiteracy was close to
20% and as much as 37% in the Northeast; average
schooling amounted to only 4.9 years and 11% of
children between 7 and 14 years of age did not attend
school. Undesirable patterns of social discrimination
persisted, based mainly on race, gender and geographic
origin. The illiteracy rate was 9% among whites but
22% among blacks and persons of mixed race. The
white population had 6.2 years of schooling on average,
whereas those of African origin had only 4.2 years.
Infant mortality, unemployment and lack of access to
health services were also disproportionately high
among the black and mixed population compared with
the white population. When they did have employment,
blacks were paid only half as much as whites.
 Paradoxically, alongside this complex structure of
exclusion, backwardness, inequality, discrimination and
vulnerability, by the end of the 1980s Brazil already
had quite an extensive State system of social protection,
especially compared with the other countries of Latin
America and Asia. As one of the pioneers of this system
in Latin America –along with Argentina, Uruguay, Chile
and Cuba– it already had a broad, complex and costly
system of protection. Strongly Bismarckian in
inspiration and with a deep influence of the State/
corporatist pattern characteristic of countries where
Catholicism exercised a major political and ideological
influence, the Brazilian system was, and still is,
characterized by uneven and fragmentary benefits
linked to the different occupational sectors and elite
groups. Because of its markedly State character, it
favoured groups with links to the public sector:
members of the armed forces, government employees
(particularly those of State-owned enterprises), officials
of the legislative and judicial corps and of typical State
activities such as the diplomatic service, and to a lesser
degree industrial workers from the most strategic
sectors.
The gradual incorporation of other sectors took
place in an uneven manner, and the pattern of
organization of the publicly-run social services
continued to show limitations in terms of access and
quality, and –in the case of education, for example- gave
the upper middle classes privileged access to higher
education. Taking all three levels of government
(federal, state and municipal), the investment and public
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expenditure required by this system represented a little
less than 20% of GDP, the bulk of this expenditure being
related to the pay-as-you-go retirement and pension
systems and other benefits associated with the
corporative system.
The 1988 Constitution, which was the fruit of the
struggle against the authoritarian regime, simply
confirmed and expanded the foundations of this system,
without taking full account of the need for its actuarial
restructuring, its fiscal impact or redistributive role, or
the challenges that it would have to face in the future,
especially those arising from the new population
dynamics. Innumerable diagnostic studies made on this
system in the 1980s revealed its incomplete, corporatist,
regressive and fragmentary nature.1
The crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s simply
exacerbated this social situation, disrupted the existing
social protection system and heightened the paradoxes
in a country marked by deep inequities and injustice.
Thus, when the growth based on State-led import
substitution industrialization had run its course, as
reflected first in the debt crisis and, subsequently, in
the worsening hyperinflation, Brazil went through a
relatively long period of sharp fluctuations in growth
rates reflected in over ten years of economic stagnation.
Indexed hyperinflation severely penalized the poorest
segments, which were unable to protect themselves, and
threw the public sector into disarray. Consequently, the
quality of the already precarious public services
declined still further, State investment slumped, and
some important public-service sectors, such as housing,
collapsed entirely.
Thus, at the start of the 1990s the country was sunk
in an unprecedented crisis. Between the end of the
1970s and the early 1990s, per capita family income
was below 250 reales most of the time, and in the period
from 1990 to 1994 it stood at practically the same level
as in 1977-1979 (figure 1). The proportion of poor
people in the population was over 50% during the 1982-
1983 crisis, and it remained at around 43% in the late
1980s and early 1990s (figure 2); in the first half of
1994, immediately after the adoption of the Plano Real,
the absolute number of poor people reached a peak of
over 67 million persons. The same occurred with the
proportion and number of indigents. At the beginning
of the 1990s, indigents accounted for more than 20%
of the population (20.4% in 1992) and numbered more
than 30 million, with the proportion rising to 29.8% in
1993-1994 (figures 3 and 4).
At the beginning of the decade, life expectancy at
birth was below 65 years, while infant mortality (43
per thousand for the country as a whole) still varied
significantly between urban and rural zones and
between regions, ranging from 28 per thousand in urban
areas of the south to over 84 per thousand in the rural
Northeast. Adult illiteracy and basic schooling rates
were incongruous with the degree of wealth and
development that the country had attained: 17% of
illiteracy among the adult population and little more
than four years of schooling.
Income distribution in Brazil reflects the gravity
of the social panorama. Despite fifty years of rapid
growth, the Gini coefficient was still around 0.600 at
the end of the 1970s and remained at this same level
for the following twenty years, with a slight worsening
of the situation at the beginning of the 1990s (figure 5).
Paradoxically, however, the country’s social
spending represented close to 19% of GDP, including
pensions, health, education, labour, housing and basic
sanitation, social welfare, programmes to support
peasant agriculture, agrarian reform and rural social
development. These investments and expenditures,
together with the associated direct income transfers,
had little distributive impact. Existing estimates –which
it should be emphasized are only tentative – show that
government transfers at this time did very little to
change the appalling income distribution situation in
the country.
1 See in particular the studies by Draibe, Guimarães de Castro and
Azeredo (1995) and Faria (1991 a and b).
FIGURE 1
Brazil: Monthly per capita household income
(Average for the periods, in 1999 reales)
Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE),
national household surveys.
a Does not include data for 1991.
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FIGURE 2
Brazil: Percentage of poor persons in each year,a 1977-2000
(Percentage of total population)
Source: Institute for Applied Economic and Social Research (IPEA) on the basis of IBGE national household surveys.
a The values shown for 1994 to 2000 are estimates.
Plano Cruzado Plano Real
FIGURE 3
Brazil: Percentage of indigents, 1977-1999
(Averages for periods, as percentages
of the population)
Source: IPEA, on the basis of IBGE national household surveys.
a Not including 1991.














































Brazil: Total population, poor population and
indigent population, between 1977 and 2000
(Averages for periods, in millions)
Total pop. Poor pop. Indigent pop.
Source: IPEA, on the basis of IBGE national household surveys and
censuses.
a Not including 1991.
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The social development of Brazil –including the
advances and necessary modifications in the social
protection systems, the necessary institutional
reforms and, above all ,  the coordination of
government social policies– should be examined
against the background of this social legacy, the grave
economic and social crisis,  the far-reaching
transformations in the pattern of growth and State
organization, and the urgent need to resolve the acute
problems of fiscal adjustment and to confront the
recurrent threats posed by the unstable international
financial situation.
III
The Plano Real and its social development strategy
After countless unsuccessful attempts at structural
adjustment of the Brazilian economy, the Brazilian
authorities set about the design, preparation and
progressive application of the Plano Real, as a response
to the challenges posed by the new forms of the
international division of labour deriving from the
evolution of world capitalism and the aftermath of the
disastrous political experience of the Collor
administration (1990-1992), which culminated in the
impeachment of the President of the Republic. This
plan, which was conceived under the direction of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the Ministry of Finance
during the government of President Itamar Franco
(1993-1994), has been applied since then and was
further consolidated during President Cardoso’s two
terms of office (1995-2002).
FIGURE 5
Brazil: Income distribution: Gini coefficient, 1977-1999
Plano Real
Source: IPEA, on the basis of IBGE national household surveys.
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Better known for its economic aspects, especially
as regards the effort to control hyperinflation and
stabilize the currency, the Plano Real has been gradually
improved over time. First, it was expanded to
encompass not only different aspects of monetary, fiscal
and foreign exchange policy, but also measures aimed
at greater economic openness and at achieving advances
in the privatization process and strengthening the
banking system. Subsequently, efforts were made to
cover issues relating to reform of the State, investments
for bringing the country’s physical and social
infrastructure in line with the new capital accumulation
requirements –in a multiyear investment plan known
as Avança Brasil- and the strengthening of regional
integration through Mercosur. Last but not least, a
comprehensive strategy for social development was
included.
This social development strategy, which was
conceived and applied in the years of the Cardoso
Government, highlights some conditions deemed
necessary, albeit not of themselves sufficient, for
promoting sustained social development, as may be
observed in the successive documents in which it is
embodied2. It outlines strategic principles to serve as
guidelines for the measures to be applied and lists six
main points around which the institutional and
programme initiatives are to be organized in order to
implement the proposed strategy. Finally, in due course,
it develops constitutional, institutional, legal and
programmatic actions for achieving the desired
objectives.
From the programme point of view, the Government
adopted some fifty major programmes which eventually
enabled it to implement the social development strategy
to a greater or lesser extent. This less familiar aspect of
the Plano Real is summed up below.
The four fundamental conditions to be
simultaneously achieved through the application of the
social policies are:
(i) Macroeconomic stability. As recent Brazilian
experience has shown, the control of inflation and
stability of the currency have an important redistributive
effect, quite apart from their contribution to financial
and administrative stability.
(ii) Fiscal austerity. Structural adjustment of the
public accounts is the indispensable complement to
price stabilization, industrial modernization,
privatization or reduction of the size of the State
and restructuring of the financial system to release
and support the Brazilian economy’s growth
potential. Without the consolidation of a new fiscal
regime, the scarcity of domestic saving would
ultimately inhibit the growth of production and
domestic consumption.
(iii) Reform of the State. This functional reform is
designed to reorient the role of the State towards the
activities where it is really essential, together with
administrative reform measures for staff training,
reforming the career structure and motivating civil
servants in order to increase public-sector efficiency,
especially in social services.
(iv) Sustained economic development. Growth rates
of at least 5% are necessary in order to cope with the
titanic task of creating enough new jobs over the next
fifteen years and achieving the higher GDP growth rates
essential for improving income distribution.
The guiding principles of the social development
strategy are listed below:
(i) Universality, solidarity and equality of
opportunity. Social policies must be based on these
principles, without losing sight of the cost-efficiency
ratio of each of the programmes.
(ii) Participation. In the design, implementation
and evaluation of social policies, it is of fundamental
importance to expand the areas of public participation
by increasing and diversifying the forms of social
participation and public control.
(iii) Decentralization. Decentralization is crucial
for public social policy implementation in a country
which is as large and heterogeneous as Brazil and which
has a strong federal structure. Direct state and municipal
participation is essential in sectors such as education
and health, although the strategic role of the central
authorities in social and regional redistribution must
not be overlooked.
(iv) Partnership. Since the Government alone
cannot take on the huge number of tasks necessary for
carrying out a coherent social policy, it will need to
enter into agreements with civil society, as represented
by companies, trade unions, universities and non-
governmental organizations. Such agreements could be
the basis for developing new public – not necessarily
State– ways of tackling problems (for example, in
health-related areas).
The Brazilian social strategy is structured along
the following lines:
(i) Thorough-going reform of basic social
services provided by the public sector, through universal
2 Cardoso, 1994, 1998 and 2001; Brazil, Office of the President of
the Republic, 1996 and 2001.
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coverage in respect of education, health, basic social
security and urban infrastructure; improvement of the
quality of services; greater efficiency, and the greater
redistributive impact of social spending.
(ii) Improving the quantity and quality of
opportunities for work and income. This includes
greater support for labour-intensive sectors,
professional training and retraining, and amendment
of the laws governing labour relationships through the
expansion of collective labour contracts.
(iii) Application of specific policies for rural areas.
Despite the growing urbanization of Brazil, close to 25%
of the economically active population is still employed
in agriculture, and many rural migrants to the cities have
not managed to integrate adequately into urban
production structures. Support for peasant agriculture
and the stimulation of new forms of survival through
agro-urban companies are therefore essential tasks.
(iv) Increasing opportunities for access to
productive assets such as land, credit and know-how.
(v) Development of initiatives and programmes
specifically designed to alleviate the most acute forms
of poverty in the short term. In Brazil, targeted
programmes mean flexibility, because it would not be
appropriate to apply the same policies in the periphery
of a big city like São Paulo and in the interior of the
Northeast region. The Community Solidarity
Programme was conceived as a means of coordinating
programmes for combating dire poverty and hunger in
the poorest regions of the country and trying out new
social initiatives in conjunction with civil society.
(vi) Establishment and improvement of direct
income transfer programmes. These programmes are a
kind of social protection system for situations of need
and risk. The main programmes in this respect are:
monthly old-age and disability benefits, which
guarantee a minimum monthly income for more than
one million elderly and poor disabled persons at an
annual cost of 3,500 million reales; rural social security,
providing benefits to more than six million agricultural
workers at a cost of 12 billion reales per year;
unemployment insurance and wage supplement
benefits, involving annual outlays of 5 billion reales
and the Bolsa-Escola school bursary programme, with
funding of some 2.5 billion reales transferred from the
Federal Government to the municipalities. In total, the
cost of federal direct transfer programmes in 2001 was
estimated at close to 20 billion reales, or more than
2.5% of GDP.
This comprehensive and ambitious strategy has
become more clear-cut over time, but there are still
important deficiencies in its application. It has not been
very successful in some of its programme objectives,
and above all it is still facing serious fiscal bottlenecks
and various constitutional, legal and institutional
challenges.
IV
Institutional aspects of the social
development strategy
Numerous obstacles and bottlenecks persist and must
be overcome before the social development strategy
outlined above can be properly implemented in Brazil,
where it is so urgently needed.
At the fiscal level, there are limitations in at least
two respects. On the one hand, a fiscal austerity policy
needs to be applied as a necessary but not of itself
sufficient condition for achieving sustained social
development. This implies severe restrictions on federal,
state and municipal public expenditure, further
strengthened by the adoption of the tough but
indispensable Fiscal Accountability Act. The significant
expenditure already incurred and the almost unavoidable
natural increase caused by the population dynamics also
represent limiting factors, especially in the areas of social
insurance and welfare, and health. From the
macroeconomic point of view, it would be very difficult
to increase the amount of social investment and
expenditure, which already stands at about 22% of GDP,
since it is a well-known fact that the higher the level of
this effort, the more difficult it is to increase it. The above-
mentioned restrictions significantly limit the leeway for
improving social protection policies.
The main obstacles to be overcome are at the
institutional level, however, and are of a legal, political
and organizational nature.
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As already indicated, the Brazilian social protection
system inherited from the past is part of the problem,
not the solution. Its corporatist and fragmentary
structure, together with its high cost and operational
inefficiency, the host of interests developed around it
(politicians, bureaucrats, suppliers and clients) and its
regressive structure of benefits has given rise to a set of
acquired rights and privileges, especially by segments
of the middle class well placed in the judicial, political,
bureaucratic and military structures of the country.
Secondly, the poor quality, inadequate
performance, restricted access and deterioration of the
public social services associated with the worsening
crisis of the late 1970s helped to trigger a process of
redemocratization under which the new Brazilian
Constitution enhanced the legal foundations of the
social protection system by spelling out in detail specific
requirements for protection which are difficult to fulfill
under the new demands of greater competitiveness, the
changing population dynamics, and fiscal austerity.
Thirdly, the very consolidation of democracy and
the resultant healthy dynamism and combativeness of
the different sectors of Brazilian society have
transformed the multiple demands arising from the
unjust social situation into organized and legitimate
pressures, particularly with respect to the fight against
hunger, exclusion, discrimination and poverty, calling
for well-targeted policies and affirmative action.
Lastly, and to sum up the foregoing, when there is
no scope for increasing expenditure or for expansion
through upward equalization mechanisms, which would
permit the expansion to take place as part of a positive-
sum game, the only path left for social policy is to
restructure financing, expenditure and benefits in order
to increase the effectiveness, coverage and redistributive
coverage of the system. In other words, the only option
is to introduce sweeping institutional changes which
imply major conflicts of interest.
Rather than dwelling at length on the details of
this vast institutional reform being implemented
through dialogue, debate and democratic struggle, we
will merely point out its main dimensions and areas of
action.
Firstly, it was and still is necessary to change the
social policy financing system and the mechanisms for
the distribution of resources and allocations among the
different spheres of government. Thus, important
initiatives were taken with respect to the social security
of private-sector workers; the forms of financing and
redistribution of federal resources for states and
municipalities in the education and health sectors, such
as the creation of the Fund for the Maintenance and
Development of Primary Education and Teacher
Upgrading, and the Minimum Basic Welfare Standards
(PAB); the procurement of new sources of funding for
health expenditure, such as the establishment of the
Provisional Levy on Financial Movements (CPMF), and
the establishment of a fund for the special programmes
for combating poverty (Poverty Alleviation
Programme).
Secondly, it was, and once again still is, necessary
to undertake an in-depth reform of the social security
institutions, both those that serve private-sector workers
and, above all, those serving the different segments of
the public sector. Here, because of the extent and scope
of the reform and the conflicts of interests that it implies,
some progress has been made with respect to social
security for private-sector workers, through the
modification of criteria relating to age, period of
contribution and length of service needed to obtain
benefits, but little has been achieved so far with regard
to public-sector employees.
Thirdly, for many of these reforms it was necessary
to modify the text of the Constitution, which demanded
a three-fifths majority vote in both chambers and the
approval of the top levels of the judiciary. In a political
system with more than thirty parties where all –even
the six or seven leading ones– are characterized by
personalism and absence of party discipline, and where
parliamentary support for the government is organized
on flimsy and unsubstantial bases, reforms of this kind
always call for a great effort and are a source of constant
political wear and tear. Some of these measures affect
the interests of the legislative and judicial branches,
which makes it difficult to secure their acceptance in
these circles of the State. The administration of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, although fairly successful
in implementing these reforms –which were also
necessary in other spheres implicit in the
implementation of the Plano Real– could not avoid this
wastage and suffered more than one major defeat, as
for example over the contribution of idle public-sector
balances.
Lastly, it is important to note that the
implementation of a social development strategy like
that which took shape in the second half of the 1990s
in Brazil calls for redoubled efforts of intra- and inter-
governmental liaison and coordination. We will
therefore examine this issue, which is the main subject
of this article, in greater depth below.
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V
Harmonization and coordination of social protection
policies. Is a social authority enough?
The importance of policy harmonization and
coordination mechanisms cannot be overstressed. This
importance increases still further with some factors,
however, especially: the size and heterogeneity of the
country; the complexity and institutional differentiation
of the State or public policy-making apparatus; the
volume and complexity of the financial resources
involved; the form of State organization (unitary,
federated or confederated States); the systems or
regimes of government (democracies or dictatorships,
constitutional monarchies, coalition-based presidential
systems, parliamentary regimes, two-party presidential
systems, etc.), and the prevailing modalities of supply
of public services (centralized State, decentralized State,
decentralized public, philanthropic liberal, market-
based liberal, etc.). These factors, in turn, affect the
definition of the main problems of policy harmonization
and coordination and, consequently, the possible
solutions.
Our own experience in the management and
evaluation of social policies in Brazil enables us to shed
some light on their recent development.
Brazil is a country of continental dimensions with
a strong and unique federal system: the federative
entities, apart from the Union, consist of 27 states, a
federal district and almost 6,000 municipalities. It has
an incipient but vigorous democracy with an active
National Congress (Senate and Federal Chamber) in
which more than twenty parties are represented, a
complex and differentiated judicial system, a free and
aggressive press, and a system of government based
on free and competitive elections, where the
representatives of the Union, the states and the larger
municipalities are chosen in periodic elections held in
two rounds. At the federal level, the system of
government may be defined as a “coalition-based
presidential regime”, which involves the formation of
complex and unstable political alliances both in order
to be elected and, even more so, for governing.
The responsibilities for executing the different
elements of Brazilian social policy –which involves
annual resources in excess of 300 billion reales– are
divided up among the Union, the states and the
municipalities. At the federal level, the social budget,
which represents about 80% of the total budget of the
Union (170 billion reales out of a total of 210 billion in
the year 2000), is distributed among some ten ministries.
Five of them –Social Security and Welfare, Health,
Education, Peasant Agriculture and Agrarian Reform,
and Labour and Employment– are large bureaucratic
structures with tradition and influence, which handle
enormous resources and are responsible for the
financing and regulatory control of policies and
programmes which, together, serve more than 150
million people.
Implementing the more than fifty programmes
through which the social protection measures are
expressed involves complex intergovernmental
relationships at the federal level and no less complex
intergovernmental relationships with other entities of
the federation. In addition, many of these programmes
also have normative or regulatory councils, made up,
in varying proportions depending on the council, of
representatives of the Federal Government, the states,
the municipalities, specific social segments –such as
employers and workers– and of civil society as a whole.
These councils are often split up into federal, state and
municipal councils.
These characteristics, which are of course not
peculiar to Brazil, pose considerable harmonization
problems for budget design and preparation, and for
the regulation, implementation and evaluation of social
policies. These are exacerbated by the demands of the
reforms now being made in the social protection system
under the Plano Real.
Four aspects of this problem, as reflected in Brazil’s
recent experience, are highlighted below together with
a brief account of the initiatives taken and an initial
evaluation of their successes and failures.
The first, most general and most decisive aspect is
that of the problems of macropolitical harmonization
and coordination, especially as regards financing and
budgeting, on the one hand, and political coordination
for carrying through the desired reforms, on the other.
In Brazil, the entities responsible for these
functions either come under the Office of the President
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of the Republic and receive an explicit mandate,
together with the support and direct participation of
the President, or else they are divided up among the
Civil Department, the General Secretariat of the Office
of the President of the Republic, the Office of the
Attorney General of the Union and the Office of the
Special Advisor in the President’s cabinet. The Minister
in charge of the General Secretariat of the Office of the
President is responsible for liaison and coordination
between the Executive and Congress, state Governors
and political parties. In addition to their specific
functions, the Office of the Attorney General of the
Union and the Office of the Special Advisor assist the
President and ministers in fulfilling these tasks of
coordination and liaison.
In this respect, the most important initiative
undertaken to improve the federal administration’s
performance was the creation of sectoral chambers,
which bring together ministers by subject areas or
macro-problems, under the operational direction of the
Minister in charge of the Civil Department. The
following sectoral chambers were created from the start:
the Economic Policies Chamber, the Infrastructure
Chamber, the Social Policy Chamber, the State Reform
Chamber and the Security and Justice Chamber. They
meet regularly –weekly or fortnightly– and are made
up of the Minister in charge of the Civil Department
–who coordinates them– the Secretary General, the
Minister of Finance, the Minister of the Budget,
Planning and Management, the sectoral ministers and
the presidents of decentralized agencies and state banks,
where appropriate. Some of these chambers also have
an executive secretary, who is responsible for putting
into effect any decisions that may be adopted. The
President of the Republic participates actively in these
meetings as often as deemed necessary by the Minister
in charge of the Civil Department and the Executive
Secretary of the Chamber. At first, the composition of
these chambers was fixed, but experience has shown
that it is more appropriate that it should vary depending
on the problems of harmonization and coordination to
be addressed.
These chambers have had varying degrees of
success; among the most successful are the Economic
Policy Chamber (which meets once a week and is
almost invariably attended by the President of the
Republic), the Infrastructure Chamber and the Social
Policy Chamber.
The Social Policy Chamber has acted as the
coordination mechanism for the social development
strategy being applied in Brazil. Its relative success
(especially in the first years of its existence and of the
application of the strategy) is attributable to four factors,
all of a political nature: the active commitment of the
central government authorities, especially the Office
of the President of the Republic; the general coincidence
of views, although not without conflicts and arduous
negotiations, among the ministers of the main social
areas (social security, health, education, labour, and
peasant agriculture and agrarian reform); the fact that
the majority of its members are highly skilled technical
staff and persons enjoying the highest trust by the
President of the Republic; and the sensitivity and
discipline shown by the economic authorities
–although once again not without conflicts and
disagreements– with respect to the decisions taken in
the Chamber and endorsed by the President of the
Republic, although the point of view of the social areas
has not always prevailed.
From this point of view, recent Brazilian experience
does not confirm that it is necessary or even desirable
to set up a “social authority” in the sense of a
bureaucratic superstructure under the control of a
ministry which has operational powers in some or all
of the sectoral areas of social policy. An initiative of
this type would not be politically viable and would be
operationally ineffective. In contrast with the situation
in the economic area, where the operational
mechanisms are relatively few and highly efficient
–the budget, the interest rate, the exchange rate and the
control of income, among others– in the social area
there are many more instruments albeit of more limited
effectiveness. Moreover, a considerable number of the
operational technical staff work in sectoral ministries,
and no matter how deficient they are now, centralizing
them in a single superstructure would only add to their
inefficiency. The Brazilian experience points rather to
the need to reform and strengthen the sectoral structures
from the functional and technical viewpoint, increasing
their strength, prestige and political power and
developing effective mechanisms rather than
bureaucratic coordination structures.
A second important aspect of the problem of
coordination refers to social protection activities which
involve conflicts and which require collaboration
between different sectors of the social area of the
Federal Government for the implementation of a
programme or project. A significant number of such
programmes and projects, above all the most innovative
ones, which seek to reform the profile of Brazilian social
policy, call for such collaboration. Thus, for example,
the Bolsa-Escola scholarship programme requires close
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operational collaboration between the Ministries of
Education, Social Security and Welfare, and Justice, as
well as the Federal Economic Fund.
The mechanism developed by the Federal
Government for dealing with problems of coordination
arose originally within the Social Policy Chamber. It
was created by an executive committee of the Chamber
and coordinated by its secretary, and it was given a
flexible format in order to help resolve the problems of
the executive secretaries of the respective ministries,
whose basic function is to put the policies, programmes
and projects into practice. Problems of integration,
liaison and operational coordination for which no
solution is found at this stage are brought before the
ministerial level of the Chamber.
Although the success of this initiative was greater
than that of macropolitical coordination, it likewise
varied from one programme to another, due more to
political and administrative factors than to problems of
bureaucratic centralization. These factors include the
technical and managerial capacity of the sectoral
executive secretaries, relatively long administrative
continuity, convergence of views on the main lines of
the social development strategy, the degree of political
support received by executive secretaries from their
respective ministries, and the legitimacy that they
manage to achieve together with their respective
administrative apparatus.
A third aspect of the coordination of social
policies at the federal level refers to problems relating
to the regional and social orientation of programmes
and their convergence. Critical diagnostic studies of
Brazilian social policy have always underscored two
major problems: the lack of targeting of some
programmes for combating poverty and regional
inequality, on the one hand, and the lack of synergy
and convergence of the programmes on the other. The
most underprivileged sectors of the Brazilian
population did not have access to social safety nets,
lacked targeted programmes, and many programmes
converged only in a few areas and sectors, excluding
many others, especially the poorest and most
underprivileged. Reform of the Brazilian social
protection system called for an effort to target some
programmes and ensure their synergy and convergence
in areas given priority because of the deficiencies
involved. It should be mentioned that many of these
programmes are of a sectoral nature and the technical
and operational capacity for implementing them
therefore lies in the sectoral administrative structures.
Furthermore, intergovernmental linkages and
coordination are crucial for carrying them through,
in addition to inter-ministerial coordination
On the basis of their own experience –especially
regarding the unsuccessful initiatives of this type taken
within the framework of the Community Action
Secretariat in the early days of democratization– and
other experience with the many social funds established
in the 1980s, the Brazilian decision-makers had
dismissed the idea of concentrating these targeted
programmes and convergence mechanisms within a
single agency, since the clientage frequent in this type
of agency, the widespread discredit of sectoral bodies,
the neglect of the technical, political and administrative
capacity accumulated at the sectoral level, and the
bureaucratic conflicts implicit in a solution of this kind
made it advisable to seek new alternatives.
Over time, the Brazilian Federal Government
developed a set of procedures, mechanisms and
structures for dealing with this difficult issue. The
starting point was the creation of a programme under
the Civil Department of the Office of the President of
the Republic, known as the Solidarity Action
Programme, which, after passing through various
stages, has split up into three or four mechanisms and
structures.
On the one hand, the Federal Government set up
and provided logistical and administrative support for
a Council made up at present of four ministers (of the
Civil Department, Finance, Planning and Justice),
twenty persons from different segments of civil society
with a recognized record of participation in initiatives
for combating exclusion and poverty, and Ruth Cardoso,
an anthropologist and university professor with a long
career as a militant in social movements and also First
Lady of the nation. Through this Council, partnerships
are being formed between the government (federal, state
and municipal) programmes, sectoral programmes and
different sectors of civil society (firms, universities,
trade unions, churches, etc,), in order to develop
innovative social policy activities in conjunction with
segments and regions selected for their needs and
deficiencies. Some of the most successful initiatives in
this area are: the literacy programmes for young people,
financed by private firms with support from the Ministry
of Education; the professional training programmes for
young people, developed by non-governmental
organizations, prefectures and trade unions, with the
support of private firms and the Ministry of Labour;
the incentive programmes for voluntary action, with
support from the Ministry of Justice, and a programme
for mobilizing the university community for the
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execution of community development projects with
support from the Ministry of Health and Education, the
armed forces and private companies. These initiatives,
which in general began on an experimental basis and
on a small scale, spread once they were successful and
took in different segments of both the public and the
private sectors as well as the tertiary sector.
After a few failed experiments, the Federal
Government is now pushing forward two initiatives,
both coordinated by the Office of the President of the
Republic, under the operational responsibility of an
executive appointed by the President; the objective of
these initiatives is to carry out in a coordinated and
synergetic way a subset of programmes for the poorest
areas in the country, selected according to social
indicators such as those included in the UNDP Human
Development Index and available to all municipalities
in the country.
The first of these, referred to as the Alvorada Project,
consists of a set of twelve programmes prepared within
the framework of the ministries of education, health,
social security and welfare, and sports and tourism,
among others. It is being supported by a Poverty
Alleviation Fund, set up by the National Congress, whose
purpose is to provide Brazilian municipalities where the
human development index is very low (under 0.500) with
the basic infrastructure necessary for social and human
development activities. The programmes are still being
conducted on a sectoral basis. The objective of the
initiative is to ensure that these sectoral programmes
reach those municipalities on a priority basis and that
they are executed jointly by the authorities and local civil
society. Their problems of intersectoral coordination are
dealt with and resolved within the ambit of the Office of
the Executive Secretary of the Social Policy Chamber.
The second initiative, which is part of a programme
called the “Active Community”, is of more limited
coverage and scope and is oriented towards supporting
community activities for integrated local development.
In each state, the poorest municipalities whose
inhabitants have shown some capacity for mobilization,
organization and action are selected with a view to
helping them to find new ways of boosting and
developing their respective regions. On the basis of the
organization and micro-entrepreneurial training
(“thrust”) of these communities, needs and demands
are identified and the Federal Government seeks to
mobilize its programmes in support of such local
development efforts.
As is evident, rather than establishing centralized
bureaucratic structures, these initiatives are aimed at
creating inter- and intra-governmental coordination
with political support from the central government
authorities.
A fourth aspect of social policy coordination refers
to the continuity and administrative effectiveness of
social programmes. From the budgetary standpoint, the
aim is to set up mechanisms to protect the main social
programmes from the cyclical variations and
expenditure cuts imposed from time to time by the
exigencies of fiscal balance. Two initiatives have been
taken in this area, both within the framework of the
Ministry of Planning, the Budget and Management.
The first of these initiatives, the “Avança Brasil”
programme, embraces a selected subset of programmes
–fifty programmes in the different areas considered to
have priority by the Government and comprising
infrastructure, social development and the generation
of knowledge– which have budgetary priority and for
which special management, follow-up and evaluation
mechanisms have been developed. This initiative also
includes another group of twelve programmes whose
budgetary items were maintained even in various
circumstances which made necessary cuts in
expenditure.
The second initiative, referred to as the Social
Safety Net, was developed in the context of the
negotiations conducted by Brazil in 1998 with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) with a
view to obtaining the support of these organizations in
order to protect the Brazilian economy from the
speculative attacks and financial crises that periodically
threaten emerging economies. In addition to targets for
controlling inflation and reducing the public deficit,
commitments and physical and financial targets were
assumed by the government in respect of twenty-two
programmes considered essential for protecting various
of the poorest segments of the population in such crisis
situations (for example, maintaining the necessary
resources for the payment of unemployment insurance
and monthly old-age and disability pensions for poor
disabled persons, together with the resources for
financing primary education).
Here, once again, the idea was to create operational
mechanisms with political backing, rather than
centralized bureaucratic structures.
Finally, mention should be made of another aspect
of the harmonization and coordination of social
policies: the relationships between the different levels
of government. In Brazil, although the Federal
Government has always played a strategic role –and
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should continue to do so– in the financing and
establishment of guidelines for social protection
programmes, their operational execution is becoming
increasingly decentralized and is left to the states and
municipalities. This need for decentralization –since
citizens do not live in the Union as such but in one of
the municipalities- poses enormous problems of
coordination and articulation in a country as large as
Brazil and with its very special federal system. Although
numerous initiatives are underway for addressing these
problems, they are so highly dispersed and persistent
that it is unlikely that the Brazilian experience can serve
as an example for a large-scale project that could be
successful in this respect, except for the examples given
earlier.
Our personal and pragmatic conclusion, based on
the problems of a country like Brazil, is that setting up
a centralized “social authority” is neither necessary nor
even advisable, if by such an authority we mean a new
bureaucratic structure that concentrates and centralizes
social policy initiatives. What is needed –apart from
the political thrust of the central authorities– is the
creation of coordination and liaison mechanisms that
have legitimacy, political support and technical
capacity.
Our experience also suggests that the recovery and
functional, technical and administrative enhancement of
the sectoral organs is a fundamental requirement for
improving the performance of governments in the social
sphere. In this respect, some of the activities relating to
reform of the State and improvement of State management
should be aimed at the upgrading of public employees
involved in end activities (teachers, doctors, social
assistants, etc.) as well as more thorough professional
training for staff engaged in instrumental activities in these
sectors (managers, business agents, human resources staff,
computer staff, etc.), by stimulating and rewarding healthy
competition, good working performance and career
advancement. In our view, as long as the difficulties arising
from the existence of old, outworn bureaucracies, which
lead to the devaluation of the public service, continue to
have their adverse effects, strategies based on the idea of
creating new structures while allowing the old ones to
gradually waste away will be doomed to failure.
Lastly, we wish to emphasize how important it is,
for the success of coordination and liaison mechanisms,
to form a politically cohesive social team which can
identify with the social development strategy proposed
by the head of the executive power and which is
technically competent.
VI
Conclusion: an overview of the results obtained
It would be beyond the scope of this study to make a
detailed evaluation of the results of Brazilian social
policy over the last ten years. Attention may be drawn
to three aspects in this respect by way of conclusion,
however.
Firstly, there are still major challenges to be
confronted in terms of improving the various social
indicators, in terms of the coverage, effectiveness and
quality of publicly provided social services, especially
health, education and public security, and in terms of
policy coordination and liaison mechanisms or even
the reform of the Brazilian social protection system,
especially as regards its redistributive role.
Secondly, while it must be recognized that much
remains to be done, the objective results of the Plano
Real in the social area are unquestionable. In spite of
budgetary constraints, federal social expenditure
reached a record level between 1993 and 1999, both in
absolute amounts and in terms of per capita expenditure
(figures 6 and 7).
Profound and far-reaching transformations were
achieved in education, especially at the primary level:
by 1999, adult illiteracy had fallen to 13.3% (figure 8);
the rate of school enrollment of children between 7 and
14 years had risen to 95.7% (figure 9); secondary school
enrollment had grown by close to 68% in six years; the
rates of school desertion and grade repetition were
lower, and there are quite a substantial number of
projects for taking children out of the labour market
and putting them all in school. The Bolsa-Escola school
bursary programme will serve 10 million children in
the next year, including practically all the children of
the six million poorest families (Brazil, Office of the
President of the Republic, 2001).
In the field of health, the Brazilian programme to
combat AIDS has become a model for the entire world.
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FIGURE 6
Brazil: Federal social expenditure, 1980-1999
(In billions of 1999 reales)
Plano Real




































Brazil: Per capita federal social spending
(Annual averages, by period, in 1999 reales)
Source: IPEA/DISOC, on the basis of monthly statistics from the SIAFI/
SIDOR systems.
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FIGURE 8
Brazil: Illiteracy rates among the population
aged 15 years and over, 1983-1999
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Important innovations are being introduced, such as
support for generic drugs and the establishment of a
basic supply of medicines. The Family Doctors
Programme now serves 3,230 municipalities with an
estimated population of 38 million. The Community
Health Agents Programme, which supplements the
former, has 144,199 agents in 4,562 municipalities and
serves 82 million persons. The national immunization
campaigns are permanently in operation, and in the year
2000 child mortality fell to 35.3 per 1000 live births
(figure 10). Federal financing for health increased from
14,800 million reales in 1995 to 26,000 million in 2001.
With regard to agrarian reform, 465,000 families
received land in 1995, which is double the number of
families benefited in the 30 years between 1964 and
1994. Almost 18 million hectares were expropriated
for agrarian reform, and in six years loans in excess of
7 billion reales were granted to peasant farmers
(figure 11).
The efforts to eradicate child labour which were
begun in 1996 have given good results, guaranteeing
attendance at school for almost 400,000 children and
adolescents who previously worked in menial or
degrading jobs (figure 12).
In the labour field, the programme to upgrade the
professional qualifications of workers (PLANFOR)
helped to increase the beneficiaries’ employment and
income possibilities, to raise productivity and
competitiveness, and to give greater employment
stability. Training was provided to 11.3 million workers
between 1995 and 2000; more than 3 million received
training in 2000 and another 4 million are estimated to
have been trained or retrained in 2001. The Employment
and Income Generation Programme (urban and rural
PROGER) is another important initiative which provides
financing for training activities as well as technological
assistance to workers. More than 1 billion reales have
been allocated annually to this programme (Cardoso,
2001).
Substantial progress has been made in direct
income transfers to individuals and families; federal
programmes of this kind (such as the rural pensions
programme, unemployment insurance, and benefits
FIGURE 10
Brazil: Infant mortality, 1990-2000
(Per thousand live births)
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FIGURE 11
Brazil: Annual settlement of landless families,
1995-2000
(Total number of families settled)













Brazil: Enrollment rate in the population
7-14 years of age, 1990-1999
(Percentage attending school)
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under the Welfare Organization Act (LOAS), the Bolsa-
Escola school bursary programme and the Bolsa-
Alimentação food allowance programme) account for
outlays of more than 20 billion reales per year.
In the seven years during which the Plano Real
has been in operation, with all its various repercussions,
the percentage of poor persons has gone down from
43.9% to 31.9% and the percentage of indigents from
19.5% to 14.5%. All social indicators, except
unemployment and underemployment, show significant
improvements.
An indicator which reflects the increase in
purchasing power resulting from the fall in inflation is
the access to consumer durables. Between 1992 and
1999, the percentage of households with television
increased from 73.4% to 87.8%; those with a
refrigerator, from 70.2% to 82.8%, and those with a
telephone from 17.5% to 37.6% (figure 13).
Although income inequality, which has been
intractable for more than thirty years, is still very high,
it has nevertheless shown a slight decrease.
Thirdly, it should be noted that Brazilian public
opinion, and especially the opposition, nevertheless find
little cause for complacency in these results, however
objective and significant they may be. The social
question continues to be a source of discontent and
dissatisfaction for large segments of the population.
Particularly significant in this regard is the
appraisal of the situation made by some specific
segments of the Brazilian middle class, especially those
that depend on the State and who benefited from the
corporatist pattern of social policy that prevailed in the
past. These people are highly dissatisfied, and there are
clear signs that their quality of life has not benefited
from the reforms to the same extent as other sectors.
Developing social protection activities for these
segments has become a growing challenge, bearing in
mind the heightened competition, changes in
professional requirements and lack of security
characteristic of the working world and urban life in
general today.
In view of this wide disparity between the objective
development of social indicators and the perception that
part of the population has of its situation, together with
the many other social lags that persist in Brazil, it is
imperative that further advances be made in the area of
social policies. It is therefore of crucial importance,
given the budgetary constraints and the restrictions
arising from the need to guarantee fiscal and
macroeconomic balance, that every effort should be




Brazil: Incidence of child labour
(10-14 age group), 1992-1999
(Percentage of children economically active
in this age group)
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FIGURE 13
Access to durable goods, 1992-1999
(Percentage of households owning such goods)
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